Official central bank interventions in the foreign exchange markets: a DCC approach with exogenous variables by Antonakakis, Nikolaos
Banks and Bank Systems, Volume 7, Issue 2, 2012 
 36
Nikolaos Antonakakis (Austria) 
Official central bank interventions in the foreign exchange markets: 
a DCC approach with exogenous variables 
Abstract 
This paper assesses the impact of official central bank interventions (CBIs) on exchange rate returns, their volatility 
and bilateral correlations. By exploiting the publication of intervention data by the Bank of England, this study is able 
to investigate official interventions by a total number of four central banks, while the previous studies have been li-
mited to three banks, namely the Federal Reserve, Bundesbank and Bank of Japan. The results of the existing literature 
are reappraised and refined. In particular, unilateral CBIs are found to be more successful than coordinated ones. The 
likely implications of these findings are then discussed. 
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Introduction © 
It is now more than two decades since the Plaza 
Agreement signed on September 22, 1985 and the 
Louvre Accord on February 22, 19871. These agree-
ments were signed in order to induce a depreciation of 
the US dollar and promote stability in currency mar-
kets, respectively. Economists, policy makers and 
central bank analysts still lack conclusive evidence on 
the impact of CBIs on exchange returns and especially 
on volatility. The majority of the empirical literature 
suggests that unilateral, and even coordinated interven-
tion of two central banks, does not affect exchange 
returns and has, in most of the cases, the opposite out-
come on volatility from that expected (among others, 
see Tuna, 2011; Pasquariello, 2010; Fatum, 2009, 
2008; Beine et al., 2007; Mark and Moh, 2007; Brand-
ner et al., 2006; Edison et al., 2006; Dominguez, 2006; 
Frenkel et al., 2005; Beine, 2004; Brissimis and Chio-
nis, 2004; Beine et al., 2003, 2002; Fatum, 2002; 
Humpage, 1999; Baillie and Osterberg, 1997; Bonser-
Neal and Tanner, 1996; Catte et al., 1992)2. That is, 
interventions associated with the Louvre Accord have 
generally led to an increase in volatility as opposed to 
the intended decrease. 
The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on the 
impact of official Central Bank Interventions (CBIs) 
on exchange rate returns, volatility and correlations of 
the DM (Euro after the 1999) and the JPY against the 
US dollar. This paper adds to the literature of CBIs in 
various respects. First, instead of relying only on G3 
official CBIs, namely, interventions by the Bank of 
Japan (BoJ), the Bundesbank (or the ECB, after 
1999) and the Federal Reserve, this study also in-
                                                     
© Nikolaos Antonakakis, 2012. 
1 The Plaza agreement was signed by the G5 countries, specifically 
France, West Germany, Japan, USA and UK, and the Louvre Accord by 
the G6 countries (Canada, France, West Germany, Japan, USA and 
UK). Italy was also an invited member in the Louvre Accord by de-
clined to finalize the agreement. 
2 See Neely (2005) and Sarno and Taylor (2001) for a survey of the 
studies regarding the effect of foreign exchange interventions in developed 
countries. For a similar survey in emerging markets see Menkhoff (2012). 
cludes interventions by the Bank of England (BoE). 
Thereby, the impact of the G4 official CBIs is ex-
amined. Such investigation will provide additional 
insights on the argument that coordinated interven-
tions are more powerful than unilateral ones (see, for 
instance Gnabo and Teiletche, 2009; Reitz and Tay-
lor, 2008; Morel and Teiletche, 2008; Carracedo and 
Manzano, 2008; Dominguez, 2006; Fatum and Hut-
chison, 2006; Beine and Szafarz, 2006; Nagayasu, 
2004; Beine, 2004; Fatum, 2002; Sarno and Taylor, 
2001; Humpage, 1999; Tseng, 1998; Baillie and Os-
terberg, 1997; Catte et al., 1992; Dominguez, 1990). 
Second, the literature has so far not investigated in a 
comprehensive way the number of central banks 
engaged in coordinated intervention. One of the main 
questions this paper tries to answer is whether the 
impact on exchange rate dynamics is more significant 
when two central banks intervene in coordination as 
opposed to three central banks. The approach adopted 
in this paper explicitly allows the investigation of the 
impact of officially announced coordinated interven-
tions of two and three central banks, since the Bank 
of England (BoE) also intervened in coordination 
with another two central banks, and which was part of 
the G6 Louvre Accord (1987). Accounting for the 
BoE’s interventions will more accurately assess the 
impact of officially announced CBIs in the post-
Louvre Accord period. Ideally, we would investigate 
the impact of officially announced CBIs of all the 
countries that were involved in the Louvre Accord. 
That is, including the Bank of Canada (BoC) and the 
Bank of France (BoF), in addition to the Bank of 
England. However, since this paper examines the 
impact of officially announced CBIs, and since nei-
ther the BoC nor the BoF officially announce their 
interventions, at least for our sample period, they 
cannot be taken into account in this research. 
This paper focuses on the signalling channel through 
which CBIs might affect exchange rate dynamics and 
not the portfolio balance channel, as the empirical 
literature is not very supportive of the latter. 
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The key findings are that unilateral CBIs are found to 
be more successful in influencing exchange returns 
than coordinated CBIs, when interventions of the Bank 
of England are taken into account. Coordinated CBIs 
increase volatility as the number of central banks in-
volved in the coordination process increases. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 1 describes the methodology and data. Sec-
tion 2 presents the empirical results and the final 
section concludes. 
1. Methodology and data 
The exchange rate data used in this study consist of 
daily observations of spot exchange rates of the 
Deutsche mark (Euro after 1999) and the Japanese 
yen, all against the US dollar, for the period of April 
2, 1991 to October 19, 2001, obtained from the 
Bank of England online database1. 
Following previous work on spot exchange rates 
data, where the spot rates are generally non-
stationary, we focus on daily exchange rate returns 
defined as: rt = ln(yt) – ln(yt-1), where yt is the spot 
exchange rate at time t, with t = 1,2,..., T, and ln is 
the natural logarithm. According to the results of the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test-statistic (not 
reported but available upon request) the null hypo-
thesis of a unit root in the first logarithmic differ-
ences of each exchange rates series is rejected. 
The CBI data consist of official interventions of the 
Federal Reserve (FED), the Bank of Japan (BoJ), 
the Bundesbank (BB) (European Central Bank, 
ECB, after 1999) and the Bank of England (BoE)2. 
Specifically, the series involve central bank pur-
chases/sales of the Japanese yen and the Deutsche 
mark (Euro after 1999) measured in US dollars. 
In order to assess the signalling channel, through 
which CBIs could influence exchange rates and their 
volatility, we use dummy variables that take the value 
of 1 when a central bank intervenes and 0 otherwise. 
In addition, we examine the impact of both unilateral 
and coordinated interventions of central banks. In the 
case of unilateral interventions, we use up to four 
dummies for CBIs (capturing the impact of the G4 
central banks included in our sample) in the JPY/USD 
and the DM(EUR)/USD markets. In the case of coor-
dinated interventions, since each of the four banks 
intervened in both the DM(EUR)/USD and the 
JPY/USD (apart from the Bundesbank (ECB) which 
intervened only in the DM(EUR)/USD), it seems 
                                                     
1 In order to make accurate comparisons, we use the same period sample 
as in Beine (2004). Moreover, the choice of this period sample is dic-
tated by the availability of official data of CBIs undertaken by the G4 
central banks. 
2 These intervention data were obtained from the Federal Reserve, the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance, the Bundesbank (ECB) and the HM 
treasury. 
appropriate to use only two dummy variables reflect-
ing the coordinated interventions of two central banks 
and one dummy for coordinated intervention of three 
central banks. Table 1 provides the definitions of the 
dummy variables used. 
Table 1. Dummy variables definitions 
Variable Definition 
Dummy variables in the conditional mean equation 
dFEDDM(EUR) Unilateral interventions of the FED in the DM(EUR)/USD market. 
dBOJJPY Unilateral interventions of the BoJ in the JPY/USD market 
dBBDM(EUR) Unilateral interventions of the BB(ECB) in the DM(EUR)/USD market 
dBoEJPY Unilateral interventions of the BoE in the JPY/USD market 
dCoDM(EUR) Coordinated interventions of 2 central banks in the DM(EUR)/USD market 
dCoDM(EUR)3 Coordinated interventions of 3 central banks in the DM(EUR)/USD market 
dCoJPY Coordinated interventions of 2 central banks in the JPY/USD market 
Dummy variables in the conditional variance equation 
δFEDDM(EUR) Unilateral interventions of the FED in the DM(EUR)/USD market 
δBOJJPY Unilateral interventions of the BoJ in the JPY/USD market 
δBBDM(EUR) Unilateral interventions of the BB(ECB) in the DM(EUR)/USD market 
δBoEJPY Unilateral interventions of the BoE in the JPY/USD market 
δCoDM(EUR) Coordinated interventions of 2 central banks in the DM(EUR)/USD market 
δCoDM(EUR)3 Coordinated interventions of 3 central banks in the DM(EUR)/USD market 
δ CoJPY Coordinated interventions of 2 central banks in the JPY/USD market 
As previously discussed the literature typically finds 
the estimated parameter of coordinated interventions 
on exchange rate volatility to be significant, howev-
er, incorrectly signed (see Gnabo and Teiletche, 
2009; Beine et al., 2009b; Beine, 2004; Fatum, 
2002; Humpage, 1999; Catte et al., 1992, among 
others). Nevertheless, the empirical literature has 
examined so far the impact of coordinated interven-
tions of a maximum of two central banks. In this 
research, we provide novel results for coordinated 
interventions conducted by three central banks. 
1.1. The DCC approach. Let yt = (y1t, y2t)’ be the 
2x1 vector of DM(EUR) and JPY exchange returns 
against the USD. Following Engle (2002), we define 
the DCC model as 
yt = µt(θ) + εt, where εt|Ωt-1 ~ N (0, Ht),    (1) 
εt = Ht1/2ut, where ut ~ N (0, I),     (2) 
Ht = DtRtDt,        (3) 
where µt = E(yt|Qt-1) is the conditional mean of yt 
given the information set Q t-1, available at time t - 1, 
and ut is the residual. We will model the mean, µt, 
Banks and Bank Systems, Volume 7, Issue 2, 2012 
 38
either as an autoregressive or a moving average 
process depending on the serial correlation proper-
ties of the series. Ht is the conditional covariance 
matrix, 1 2 1 211 22( ,..., ) 't t tD diag h h=  is a diagonal matrix 
of square root conditional variances, where h11t and 
h22t can be defined as any univariate GARCH-type 
model, and Rt is the 2(2 1)
2
tx −⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
matrix containing the 
time-varying conditional correlations defined  
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
11, 22, 11, 22,( , ) ( , ),t t t t t tR diag q q Q diag q q
− − − −=  (6) 
where Qt = (qij,t) is a 2x2 symmetric positive defi-
nite matrix given by:  
1 1 1(1 ) ,t t t tQ Q u u Qα β α β− − −′= − − + +    (7) 
where ut = (u1t, u2t)’ is the 2x1 vector of standar-
dized residuals, Q is the 2x2 unconditional va-
riance matrix of ut, and α and β are nonnegative 
scalar parameters satisfying α + β < 1. 
The DCC model is estimated using the Quasi-
Maximum Likelihood (QML) estimator under a 
multivariate Student distribution (see Harvey et al., 
1992; Fiorentini et al., 2003), as the normality of 
the residuals is rejected. 
1.2. The effect of CBI. In order to assess the impact 
of CBIs on exchange returns, volatility and correla-
tions the DCC model of Engle (2002) can be easily 
extended to incorporate exogenous variables as: 
yt = µt + dtXt + εt, where εt|Ωt-1 ~ N(0,Ht),   (8) 
1 2 ,t t tH uε =  where ut ~ N(0,I),    (9) 
Ht = DtRtDt,     (10) 
where dt is the nx1 vector of parameters entering 
the mean equation and Xt is a nx1 vector of ex-
ogenous variables that denote the set of central 
bank interventions at time t. The specification for 
the proposed model has a different evolution for 
Qt that enters the Rt matrix containing the time-
varying conditional correlations and the later 
enters the conditional variance/covariance matrix 
Ht according to: 
1 1 1(1 ) ,t t t t t tQ Q u u Q Xα β α β δ− − −′= − − + + +  (11) 
where δt is the nx1 vector of parameters entering 
the conditional variance equation and Xt is a nx1 
vector of exogenous variables that denote the set of 
central bank interventions at time t1. We focus on 
the impact of both unilateral and coordinated CBIs 
on exchange returns, variances and correlations. 
                                                     
1 More precisely, the dummy variables for CBIs equal to 1 when central 
bank(s) intervene in the purchase or sale of US dollars and to 0 when no 
intervention occurs. See Table 1 for a specific definition of the dummy 
variables used. 
2. Empirical results 
2.1. Descriptive statistics. Table 2 presents descrip-
tive statistics of the mark(euro), and the yen returns 
series for the period from April 2, 1991 to October 19, 
2001. According to Table 2, the daily unconditional 
standard deviations of the JPY/USD return is greater 
than that for the DM(EUR) exchange return, indicating 
that volatility is greater in the JPY as opposed to the 
DM(EUR) returns. The excess kurtosis parameter 
estimate is significantly greater than zero for each 
returns series indicating non-normality of returns. In 
addition, the excess kurtosis coefficient in JPY returns 
is more than twofold than that in DM(EUR) returns, 
indicating that extreme episodes (such as currency 
crises) are more than twice likely to occur in the JPY 
than in the DM(EUR) market. In addition, the Jarque-
Bera statistic confirms that exchange returns are, as 
expected, not normally distributed since the null hypo-
thesis of normally distributed returns is persuasively 
rejected and the data are clearly skewed. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of returns 
(April, 2, 1991-October, 19, 2001) 
 DM(EUR) JPY 
Mean 0.0001 -0.0001 
Standard deviation 0.0068 0.0073 
Skewness -0.1294 [0.01]** -0.7031 [0.00]** 
Excess kurtosis 2.1193 [0.00]** 5.7496 [0.00]** 
Normality test (JB) 507.11 [0.00]** 3897.6 [0.00]** 
Q(10) 18.885 [0.04]* 20.746 [0.02]* 
Q2(10) 143.94 [0.00]** 288.63 [0.00]** 
ARCH (5) 12.590 [0.00]** 27.489 [0.00]** 
Note: [] denote p-values. Q(10) and Q2(10) is the Ljung-Box 
statistic for serial correlation in raw series and squared series, 
respectively. JB refers to the Jarque-Bera test. * 5% significant; 
** 1% significant. 
The Ljung-Box Q statistic which tests the null hypo-
thesis of no serial correlation in the return and the 
squared return series rejects the null hypothesis up to 
10 lags. The presence of strong nonlinear dependen-
cies in the squared return series is also supported by 
Engle’s ARCH-LM statistic in the last row of Table 2 
which reports evidence of ARCH effects in the return 
series up to 5 lags. The null hypothesis of no ARCH 
effects is rejected for each series at the 1% level of 
significance. 
Figure 1, plots the exchange rates and returns series for 
the DM(EUR) and the JPY, all against the USD. One 
can clearly observe the introduction of the Euro at the 
beginning of 19992. Focusing on the returns plots on 
the lower part of Figure 1, one can see the phenome-
non of volatility clustering, that is, large (small) 
changes tend to be followed by large (small) changes 
of either sign. 
                                                     
2 The DM(EUR)/USD returns series on the bottom left panel in Figure 1 
have been adjusted to account for the introduction of the Euro in 1999. 
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Fig. 1. DM(EUR)/USD and JPY/USD exchange rates and returns series (April, 2, 1991-October, 19, 2001)
The findings of higher order serial correlation, non-
normality, non-linear dependency and volatility 
clustering support the decision to model exchange 
rate volatility using a GARCH-type process under 
the Student’s t-distribution. 
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 3 present the number of 
days that CBIs were carried out under the G4 as-
sessment and under Beine’s (2004) G3 assessment 
(which serve as the base for our comparisons), re-
spectively. As previously indicated, and as can also 
be observed from Table 3, the number of interven-
tions for the variables in common among this re-
search and Beine’s is different due to the interven-
tion definitions in this research1. 
                                                     
1 By definition, in this research, the classification of CBIs differs. For 
instance, when the dummy variable that represents coordinated inter-
ventions conducted by 3 central banks in a currency and on a specific 
date is equal to 1, then instantaneously the dummy for coordinated 
interventions conducted by 2 central banks is equal to zero for that 
specific intervention and date. In addition, the dummy variables that 
represent the unilateral interventions for each of the 3 central banks 
are equal to zero on that date. For example, consider the sell of the 
DM/USD on August 19, 1991 by the BoJ, the BB and BoE. Under 
Beine’s (2004) framework and the rest of the papers that examined 
CBIs under the G3 assessment (that is without the BoE assessment) 
the construction of the intervention dummy variables for that date 
implies that these dummies are equal to zero for unilateral interven-
tions by the BoJ and the BB, and equal to 1 for coordinated interven-
tions of 2 central banks. Under our proposed classification, the dum-
my variables for unilateral intervention by the BoJ, the BB, the BoE 
and coordinated interventions of 2 central banks are equal to zero. 
However, the dummy variable for coordinated intervention of 3 
central banks equals to 1. That is why in this classification there are 
fewer interventions regarding unilateral and coordinated interventions 
by 2 central banks than those in Beine (2004). 
Table 3. Central bank interventions: 
(April, 2, 1991-October, 19, 2001) 
Beine (2004) 
 G4 assesment G4 assessment 
JPY/USD Number of interventions 
Unilateral FED 0 1 
Unilateral BoJ 176 180 
Unilateral BoE 1 - 
Coordinated interventions of 
2 central banks 22 19 
DM(EUR)/USD 
Unilateral FED 7 12 
Unilateral BoJ 0 0 
Unilateral BB/ECB 5 6 
Unilateral BoE 8 - 
Coordinated interventions of 
2 central banks 10 12 
Coordinated interventions of 
3 central banks 6 - 
Note: The last column is taken from Table 2 of Beine (2004). 
Among the G4 central banks, the Bank of Japan 
(BoJ) was by far the most active, as it intervened 
176 times unilaterally in the JPY/USD market. The 
FED has conducted its interventions unilaterally 
only in the DM(EUR)/USD market. In addition, the 
FED relied solely on coordinated interventions with 
the BoJ in the JPY/USD market, whereas in the 
DM(EUR)/USD market it intervened with the BoJ, 
the BB/ECB and/or the BoE since 1995. The Bun-
desbank (BB) (or the European Central Bank, ECB, 
since 1999) has deployed its interventions solely in 
the DM(EUR)/USD market. A very interesting fea-
ture of Table 3 is the nature of the Bank of England 
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(BoE) interventions. The BoE has intervened in 
coordination with at least one another central bank 
in both markets. Unilaterally it has intervened one 
time in the JPY/USD market and eight times in the 
DM(EUR)/USD market. Moreover, it has inter-
vened six times in coordination with another two 
central banks in the DM(EUR)/USD as shown in the 
last row of column 1 in Table 3. The availability of 
official intervention data for the BoE motivates the 
examination of how the impact of CBIs on exchange 
returns, volatility and correlation changes when the 
BoE is also taken into account. 
2.2. The DCC model performance. Table 4 presents 
the results of the DCC model performance described 
in equation (1)-(3). 
Table 4. DCC model of DM (EUR) and  
JPY returns (April, 2, 1991-October, 19, 2001) 
Dependent variables Explanatory variables 
Conditional 
mean 
DM(UER) Constant 0.0002 (1.99)* 
JPY Constant 0.0243 (2.41)* 
Conditional 
variance 
DM(EUR) 
Constant 1.2e-07 (2.10)* 
αDM(EUR) 0.0351 (5.74)** 
βDM(EUR) 0.9596 (131.4)** 
JPY 
Constant 0.0035 (2.70)** 
αJPY 0.0416 (6.73)** 
βJPY 0.9517 (135.5)** 
DCCα 0.0132 (261.1)** 
DCCβ 0.9847 (967.3)** 
 υ 5.7691 (13.19)** 
 Log. lik. 7454.59 
Standardized residuals based tests 
  Q(20) 79.964 [0.45] 
  Q2(20) 87.440 [0.20] 
Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis. * and ** denote 5% and 1% 
significance, respectively. 
The DCC model seems to perform very well in terms 
of capturing the DM(EUR)/USD and the JPY/USD 
exchange rate dynamics: (1) both exchange returns 
exhibit heteroskedasticity, based on the significant 
estimated coefficients of the individual GARCH mod-
els; (2) the conditional correlations of the DM(EUR)/ 
USD and the JPY/USD returns are highly persistent as 
shown by the significant parameter estimates (α and β) 
of the DCC GARCH model; (3) Li and McLeod 
(1981) test (which is a multivariate version of the 
Box-Pierce/Ljung-Box portmanteau test statistic 
for serial correlation) cannot reject the null hypo-
thesis of no serial correlation on both standardized 
and squared standardized residuals, up to 20 lags; 
(4) the DCC model indicates that the correlations 
between these two returns are indeed time-varying. 
This can also be clearly seen in Figure 2, which 
plots the dynamic conditional correlation of the 
estimated DCC model in Table 4. The correlations 
during April 2, 1991 to October 19, 2001 vary be-
tween -0.05 to 0.8. Beginning from 1991, correla-
tions between those two markets gradually de-
clined till 1994, then there was an increasing trend 
till the mid-1995 followed by a declining trend till 
the end of 2000 when they became negative. Since 
the beginning of 2001, correlations varied around  
-0.05 to 0.2. 
 
Fig. 2. Conditional correlations of the DM(EUR)/USD and the JPY/USD returns 
Having evaluated the performance of the basic DCC 
model for the DM(EUR)/USD and JPY/USD ex-
change returns dynamics, we now extend the DCC 
with exogenous variables to incorporate the im-
pact of both unilateral and coordinated officially 
announced interventions. 
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2.3. The impact of coordinated interventions. The 
analysis begins with the impact of coordinated inter-
ventions on exchange returns, variances and correla-
tions under the G4 assessment. These results are 
presented in Table 5. Columns (a) and (b), (c) and 
(d), and (e) present the results for coordinated inter-
ventions of 2 central banks in the DM(EUR)/USD 
and the JPY/USD markets, of 3 central banks in the 
DM(EUR)/USD market, and of 3 central banks in the 
DM(EUR)/USD market together with the coordinated 
interventions of 2 central banks in the JPY/USD mar-
ket, respectively. 
Table 5. Coordinated CBIs: signalling channel analysis of DM(EUR) & JPY (1991-2001) 
Dependent var. Explanatory var. (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
Condit. mean 
DM(USD) 
Constant 0.0002 (2.30)* 0.0002 (2.30)* 0.0002 (2.12)* 0.0002 (2.13)* 0.0002 (2.07)* 
dCoDM(EUR) 0.0015 (0.49)     
dCoDM(EUR) 3   0.0059 (1.62)   
dCoJPY 3E-05 (0.02)     
JPY 
Constant 0.0229 (2.33)* 0.0231 (2.24)* 0.0248 (2.51)* 0.0247 (2.36)* 0.0240 
dCoDM(EUR) 0.1858 (0.77)     
dCoDM(EUR) 3   0.1194 (0.64)   
dCoJPY -0.0019 (-0.01)     
Condit. var. 
DM(EUR) 
Constant 3.4e-07 (2.26)* 3.4e -07 (2.09)* 3.2e-07 (2.29)* 3.3e-07 (2.48)* 3.3e-07 (2.23)* 
δCoDM(EUR) 7.2e-06 (0.90) 7.4e-06 (0.88)    
δCoDM(EUR) 3   2.1e-05 (1.57) 2e-05 (2.14)* 2.4e-05 (1.76) 
δCoJPY -3.3e-07 (-0.09) -2.1e-07 (-0.06)   2.3e-06 (0.63) 
αDM(EUR) 0.0352 (5.78)** 0.0348 (5.72)** 0.0326 (5.78)** 0.0330 (5.17)** 0.0332 (5.19)** 
βDM(EUR) 0.9589 (135)** 0.9592 (130)** 0.9612 (140)** 0.9605 (133)** 0.9600 (126)** 
JPY 
Constant 0.0036 (2.34)* 0.0037 (2.49)* 0.0037 (2.34)* 0.0037 (2.49)* 0.0039 (2.25)* 
δCoDM(EUR) -0.0690 (-3.05)** -0.0736 (-1.73)    
δCoDM(EUR) 3   0.0123 (0.28) 0.0181 (0.51) 0.0231 (0.58) 
δCoJPY 0.1082 (2.31)* 0.1123 (2.37)*   0.0950 (1.98)* 
αJPY 0.0394 (5.66)** 0.0396 (6.30)** 0.0420 (6.30)** 0.0420 (6.08)** 0.0407 (6.19)** 
βJPY 0.9522 (122)** 0.9519 (126)** 0.9506 (121)** 0.9506 (123)** 0.9497 (115)** 
DCCα 0.0190 (4.99)** 0.0192 (4.93)** 0.0182 (4.91)** 0.0183 (4.91)** 0.0192 (5.01)** 
DCCβ 0.9789 (229)** 0.9787 (227)** 0.9798 (233)** 0.9796 (232)** 0.9789 (225)** 
 υ 5.8473 (14.06)** 5.8471 (13.29)** 5.8535 (12.85)** 5.8766 (13.29)** 5.9604 (13.36)** 
 Log. lik. 7461.2 7460.6 7460.1 7458.9 7461.6 
Standardized residuals based tests 
  Q(20) 78.62 [0.49] 78.73 [0.49] 77.76 [0.52] 76.26 [0.57] 75.75 [0.58] 
 Q2(20) 87.28 [0.20] 86.35 [0.22] 93.55 [0.10] 97.12 [0.06] 92.56 [0.11] 
Note: Parentheses and brackets are the t-statistics and p-values, respectively. * and ** denote 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
 
When coordinated interventions are conducted by 
only 2 central banks in the DM(EUR)/USD and the 
JPY/USD markets, they have a significant impact 
only on the JPY volatility. However, no significant 
impact on exchange returns is evident. That is, 
coordinated interventions do not affect exchange 
returns, which in line with the empirical literature. 
These results are presented in columns (a) and (b) of 
Table 5. Under specification (a), the dummy variables 
for coordinated CBIs that enter in both the mean and 
variance equations, attract significant coefficients 
only in the latter equation. Specifically, coordinated 
interventions in the DM(EUR)/USD market signifi-
cantly decrease the JPY volatility whereas, coordi-
nated interventions in the JPY/USD market signifi-
cantly increase the JPY volatility. In addition, coor-
dinated CBIs in the DM(EUR)/USD and the 
JPY/USD markets do not have a significant impact 
on the DM(EUR) volatility. After dropping the dum-
my variables for the coordinated CBIs on returns, as 
they were found insignificant, the new specification 
under column (b) reports reduced impact of coordi-
nated interventions on volatility. Now, coordinated 
CBIs in the DM(EUR)/USD markets do not signifi-
cantly decrease the JPY volatility (the estimated para-
meter δCoDM is significantly negative only at the 
10% level). The signs and significance of the rest of 
the parameter estimates remain similar to those under 
specification (a). That is, when exactly two central 
banks intervene in coordination can significantly affect 
the volatility of returns, and in some cases in the cor-
rect direction. Under (a) and (b) specifications, the Li 
and McLeod (1981) test reports no evidence of serial 
correlation on both standardized and squared standar-
dized residuals, up to 20 lags. Thus, we find instances 
that coordinated interventions of two central banks 
under the G4 assessment in the DM(EUR)/USD mar-
ket to significantly decrease JPY volatility. 
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In addition, the existing literature suggests that 
coordinated interventions have a more significant 
impact on volatility as opposed to unilateral ones 
(see, for instance Reitz and Taylor, 2008; Morel and 
Tei'letche, 2008; Carracedo and Manzano, 2008; Do-
minguez, 2006; Fatum and Hutchison, 2006; Beine 
and Szafarz, 2006; Nagayasu, 2004; Beine, 2004, 
2003; Fatum, 2002; Humpage, 1999; Tseng, 1998; 
Baillie and Osterberg, 1997; Catte et al., 1992; Do-
minguez, 1990). The results reported in the next 
section, regarding the impact of unilateral interven-
tions under the DCC model, are in line with this 
finding. However, there is no paper, to our know-
ledge, that examines the impact of a greater number 
of two central banks intervening in coordination. If 
the previous argument is correct, then coordinated 
interventions of three central banks should increase 
even more the impact on exchange rate volatility 
compared to interventions of one or two central banks. 
According to Table 3, the Bank of England (BoE) 
intervened six times in our investigation sample in 
coordination with another two central banks in 
the DM(EUR)/USD market. Thus, it would be of 
interest to see how our results change when three 
central banks coordinate their interventions. Besides, 
apart from the FED, the BoJ and the BB/ECB, the 
BoE was among the G6 that signed the Louvre Ac-
cord in 1987 (and which officially announces its inter-
ventions). As previously mentioned, the aim of the 
Louvre Accord was to stabilize the turbulent interna-
tional currency markets. Hence, the post-Louvre 
period performance of the impact of a greater num-
ber of central banks intervening in coordination on 
exchange rate dynamics is of great importance. 
The results for coordinated interventions of three 
central banks in the DM/USD market are presented 
under columns (c) and (d) in Table 5. Since there were 
not any coordinated interventions conducted by three 
central banks in the JPY/USD market, we can only 
examine the impact of coordinated interventions of 
three central banks in the DM(EUR)/USD market. 
Under column (c) the dummies representing coordi-
nated interventions of three central banks in the 
DM(EUR)/USD market enter both in the conditional 
mean and variance equations, whereas under column 
(d) enter only in the conditional variance equation. 
Table 5 shows that, under column (c), the impact of 
coordinated CBIs of three central banks is dramati-
cally different to the impact of coordinated interven-
tions of two central banks. Specifically, coordinated 
interventions of three central banks in the DM/USD 
market do not have a significant impact on exchange 
returns and volatilities. However, when the insignifi-
cant impact of three central banks in the DM/USD in 
the conditional mean equation is removed, the results 
under column (d) show that coordinated interventions 
of three central banks significantly increase the 
DM(EURO) volatility. The robustness of these re-
sults is strengthened even when coordination of three 
central banks in the DM(EUR)/USD market are 
modeled together with the coordination of two central 
banks in the JPY/USD market. These results are pre-
sented under column (e) in Table 5. That is, the 
greater number of central banks engaging in coordi-
nated interventions does not necessarily increase the 
effectiveness on volatility. On the contrary, when 
more than two central banks intervene in coordina-
tion the outcome is rise in exchange rate volatility. 
The DCC model under the various specifications in 
Table 5 do not suffer from serial correlation as the Li 
and McLeod (1981) test reports no evidence of serial 
correlation on both standardized and squared standar-
dized residuals up to 20 lags. Figure 3, which plots 
the dynamic conditional correlations of the DCC 
model without exogenous variables (specification in 
Table 4), together with the ones from the DCC with 
exogenous variables in the estimations under col-
umns (b) and (d) of Table 5, shows that the magni-
tude of correlations is slightly intensified due to 
coordinated interventions and which is in line with 
Nikkinen and Vähämaa (2009). 
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Fig. 3. Dynamic conditional correlations of the DM(EUR)/USD and the JPY/USD returns, 
including those from columns (b) and (d) of Table 5 
These results could be of great importance for cen-
tral banks’ decisions on conducting coordinated in-
terventions in a currency. According to these results 
if central banks wish to reduce exchange rate volatil-
ity, then it is preferable to intervene in coordination 
with only one another central bank and not in coordi-
nation with another two central banks; if intervention 
occurs in coordination with more than one another 
central bank it will not have the anticipated outcome. If 
a central bank wishes to affect its exchange returns it 
 
 
should not intervene in coordination. Intervening in 
coordination with at least another central bank will 
have no effect on exchange returns, as the vast ma-
jority of the literature suggests. 
2.4. The impact of unilateral interventions. The 
empirical results of the impact of unilateral CBIs on 
exchange rate returns, variances and correlations are 
presented in Table 6. Columns (a) and (b) present 
the results for the G3 and G4 unilateral CBIs, re-
spectively1. 
Table 6. Unilateral CBIs: signalling channel analysis of DM(EUR) & JPY (1991-2000)1 
Dependent variables Explanatory variables (a) (b) 
Conditional mean 
DM(EUR) 
Constant 0.0003 (2.96)** 0.0003 (2.70)** 
dFEDDM(EUR) -0.0013 (-0.56) -0.0013 (-0.59) 
dBOJJPY -0.0011 (-2.88)** -0.0011 (-2.48)* 
dBBDM(EUR) 0.0051 (1.79) 0.0051 (1.54) 
dBoEJPY  0.0319 (6.29)** 
JPY 
Constant 0.0310 (3.39)** 0.0310 (3.27)** 
dFEDDM(EUR) -0.2029 (-1.01) -0.2081 (-1.28) 
dBOJJPY -0.1394 (-3.91)** -0.1392 (-3.23)** 
dBBDM(EUR) 0.0064 (0.05) 0.0074 (0.05) 
dBoEJPY  0.7673 (3.11)** 
Conditional variables DM(EUR) 
Constant 1e-05 (40.6)** 3e-07 (2.15)* 
δFEDDM(EUR) -4e-06 (-0.77) -4e-06 (-0.67) 
δBOJJPY 1e-06 (2.15)* 1e-06 (1.60) 
δBBDM(EUR) 1e-06 (0.14) -1e-06 (-0.11) 
δBoEJPY  -2.2e-06 (-0.08) 
                                                     
1 The dummy variables used in the evaluation of the impact of the G3 and G4 CBIs are based on those in column 1 of Table 3. That is, these dum-
mies are based on the definition of CBIs under the G4 assessment. In the following section which involves robustness analysis we present the results 
of the impact of unilateral interventions according to the dummies used in Beine’s (2004) paper under the G3 assessment. 
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Table 6 (cont.). Unilateral CBIs: signalling channel analysis of DM(EUR) & JPY (1991-2000) 
Dependent variables Explanatory variables (a) (b) 
  αDM(EUR) 0.0344 (8.16)** 0.0344 (5.70)** 
βDM(EUR) 0.9583 (252)** 0.9589 (129)** 
JPY 
Constant 0.0036 (2.69)** 0.0037 (2.24)* 
δFEDDM(EUR) -0.0020 (-0.04) -0.0033 (-0.05) 
δBOJJPY 0.0020 (0.37) 0.0020 (0.28) 
δBBDM(EUR) -0.0850 (-4.76)** -0.0854 (-3.58)** 
δBoEJPY  -0.0281 (-0.34) 
αJPY 0.0393(6.71)** 0.0394 (5.93)** 
βJPY 0.9537 (136)** 0.9534 (117)** 
DCCα 0.0187 (7.21)** 0.0184 (4.58)** 
DCCβ 0.9790 (327)** 0.9793 (213)** 
 υ 5.7413 (14.11)** 5.7555 (22.87)** 
 Log. lik. 7467.5 7474.8 
Standardized residuals based tests 
  Q(20) 78.4882 [0.50] 78.2778 [0.50] 
 Q2(20) 84.8886 [0.25] 86.3596 [0.22] 
Note: Parentheses and brackets are the t-statistics and p-values, respectively. * and ** denote 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
 
The results of the DCC model extended with ex-
ogenous variables under column (a) in Table 6 pro-
vide evidence that unilateral G3 interventions have 
little impact on both mean returns and variances. 
Only CBIs conducted by the BoJ in the JPY/USD 
market significantly affect both the JPY and 
DM(EUR) returns. Specifically, unilateral interven-
tions of the BoJ cause an appreciation of the US dol-
lar. Unilateral interventions of the FED and the BB 
do not have a significant impact on the two returns. 
Another interesting feature of column (a) in Table 6 
is that unilateral interventions of the BoJ and the 
BB(ECB), have a significantly negative and positive 
externality effect in the JPY/USD and the DM(EUR)/ 
USD markets, respectively. That is, unilateral inter-
ventions of the BoJ in the JPY/USD market signifi-
cantly increase the DM(EUR) volatility and unilateral 
interventions of the BB(ECB) in the DM(EUR)/USD 
market significantly reduce the JPY volatility. The 
unilateral intervention impact of the FED on volatil-
ity of both returns is correctly negatively signed but 
insignificant. 
Including the BoE’s unilateral interventions under 
our G4 assessment, the results seem to be more 
straightforward. Column (b) in Table 6, which 
presents these results, shows no evidence of signif-
icant increase in volatility due to unilateral official 
CBIs, which is in line with central banks’ intentions. 
That is, the impact of the BoJ intervention in the 
JPY/USD market on the DM(EURO) volatility now 
becomes insignificantly positive and the BB(ECB) 
intervention in the DM(EUR)/USD market on the 
DM(EURO) volatility is now correctly negatively 
signed, although insignificant. The impact of inter-
ventions of the BoE in the JPY/USD market on both 
returns’ volatility is also correctly signed, although 
insignificant. 
In addition to the previous results, under column (a) 
in Table 6, of the impact of the G3 CBIs on ex-
change returns (with the use of dummies under the 
G4 assessment), unilateral interventions of the BoE 
significantly affect both DM(EUR) and JPY returns, 
under column (b) in Table 6. That is, taking into 
account the BoE, unilateral interventions seem to have 
a significant effect on returns and volatility. One ma-
jor point of central banks’ decisions to intervene is to 
decrease rather than increase exchange rate volatility. 
In this research we provide evidence that unilateral 
interventions are somewhat more productive, as their 
impact on returns is significant, and on volatility is 
correctly negatively signed and significant in the case 
of the BB(ECB) interventions in the DM(EUR)/USD 
market on the JPY volatility. No evidence that any of 
the unilateral interventions significantly increases 
volatility is reported, which is in line with central 
banks’ intentions. 
The conditional correlations of the DM(EUR) and 
JPY returns are highly persistent as shown by the 
significant estimated α and β parameters of these 
two DCC models in Table 6. Figure 4, which plots 
the dynamic conditional correlations of the DCC 
without exogenous variables (specification shown in 
Table 4), together with the ones from the DCC with 
exogenous variables from (a) and (b) in Table 6 
shows that unilateral interventions slightly increase 
the magnitude of correlations. 
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Fig. 4. Dynamic conditional correlations of the DM(EUR)/USD and the JPY/USD returns, 
including those from columns (a) and (b) of Table 6
2.5. Robustness analysis. Having found evidence 
that unilateral interventions are more productive 
as opposed to coordinated interventions of 2 or 3 
central banks under the G4 assessment, as the 
former affect returns and in minor cases reduce 
volatility, in this section several robustness checks 
are being performed. In order to check the robust-
ness of the results regarding the impact of the 
officially announced G4 unilateral and coordinated 
CBIs, dummy variables representing the impact of 
officially announced G3 CBIs were constructed. 
That is, we omitted the BoE interventions, and 
replicated Beine’s (2004) analysis by using the 
same dates and variables but under the DCC 
framework1. These results are presented in col-
umns (a) and (b) on Table 7. 
Table 7. Replication of Beine (2004) estimations under the G3 impact through the DCC model1 
 Coordinated interventions Unilateral interventions 
Dependent variables Explanatory variables (a) (b) (c) (d) 
Conditional mean 
DM(EUR) 
Constant  0.0002 (2.21)*  0.0002 (2.35)* 
dCoDM(EUR) 0.0035 (1.44)    
dCOJPY -0.0001 (-0.07)    
dFEDDM(EUR)   0.0003 (0.17)  
dBBDM(EUR)   0.0050 (1.76)  
JPY 
Constant  0.0236 (2.48)*  0.0239 (2.49)* 
dCoDM(EUR) 0.1451 (0.90)    
dCOJPY 0.0333 (0.17)    
dBOJJPY   -0.0655 (-1.73)  
dBOJDM(EUR)   0.0280 (0.00)  
Conditional 
variables DM(EUR) 
Constant 4e-07 (2.01)* 4e-07 (2.39)* 4e-07 (2.48)* 4e-07 (41.84)** 
δCoDM(EUR) 1e-05 (1.82) 2e-05 (2.06)*   
δCOJPY -1e-06 (-0.18) -1e-06 (-0.15)   
δFEDDM(EUR)   -4e-06 (-0.83) -4e-06 (-0.82) 
δBoJJPY   1e-06 (1.69) 1e-06 (2.14)* 
δBBDM(EUR)   1e-06 (0.15) 3e-06 (0.27) 
αDM(EUR) 0.0334 (5.37)** 0.0330 (5.29)** 0.0344 (6.10)** 0.0341 (26.79)** 
βDM(EUR) 0.9588 (116)** 0.9592 (127)** 0.9579 (137)** 0.9585 (866)** 
 JPY Constant 0.0042 (2.35)* 0.0042 (2.51)* 0.0036 (2.91)** 0.0037 (8.28)** 
                                                     
1 The dummy variables used for the G3 assessment were constructed based on the number of CBIs shown in the last column of Table 3. 
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Table 7 (cont.). Replication of Beine (2004) estimations under the G3 impact through the DCC model 
 Coordinated interventions Unilateral interventions 
Dependent variables Explanatory variables (a) (b) (c) (d) 
  δCoDM(EUR) -0.0123 (-0.50) -0.0090 (-0.32)   
δCOJPY 0.1009 (1.98)* 0.1021 (1.99)*   
δFEDDM(EUR)   -0.0019 (-0.0357) -0.0032 (-0.0651) 
δBOJJPY   0.0022 (0.3555) 0.0022 (0.4500) 
δBBDM(EUR)   -0.0825 (-3.8711)** -0.0842 (-3.8631)** 
αJPY 0.0404 (5.9160)** 0.0406 (5.7592)** 0.0392 (7.1439)** 0.0400 (30.6338)** 
βJPY 0.9496 (112.1868)** 0.9495 (107.9598)** 0.9539 (148.3135)** 0.9528 (831.0234)** 
DCCα 0.0190 (4.4552)** 0.0196 (4.8976)** 0.0183 (4.8422)** 0.0184 (19.1672)** 
DCCβ 0.9791 (209.2930)** 0.9784 (215.6425)** 0.9795 (227.6701)** 0.9793 (873.6994)** 
 υ 6.0272 (12.8189)** 5.9500 (13.0542)** 5.8488 (14.5558)** 5.7838 (17.7490)** 
 Log. lik. 7460.2167 7462.4958 7460.6221 7461.1064 
Standardized residuals based tests 
  Q(20) 77.8420 [0.5157] 76.0561 [0.5730] 78.6535 [0.4898] 79.4615 [0.4643] 
 Q2(20) 88.8644 [0.1675] 92.9871 [0.1036] 83.1936 [0.29470] 86.4296 [0.2165] 
Note: Parentheses and brackets are the t-statistics and p-values, respectively. * and ** denote 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
 
The results are qualitatively identical to those of 
Beine (2004) obtained from the estimation of the 
VECH model for the equivalent parameters. That is, 
officially announced G3 unilateral and coordinated 
interventions affect exchange rate volatility and have 
no impact on returns. These results justify the robust-
ness of the results obtained in the previous under the 
G4 assessment through the DCC framework. 
Another point of interest is to examine whether 
specific central banks whose unilateral interventions 
were found to be effective, could still be effective 
when conducted in coordination with another specif-
ic central bank. As evidence indicated above that 
 
the Bundesbank (or ECB after 1999) interventions 
in the DM(EUR)/USD market reduce volatility, it is 
of interest to check whether the Bundesbank (ECB) 
intervening together with at least another central 
bank could decrease exchange rate volatility. The 
Bundesbank (ECB) intervened in coordination with 
at least another central bank in the DM(EUR)/ 
USD market fifteen times. The choice of specific 
central banks intervening in coordination might shed 
more light on the positive effect of coordinated in-
terventions on volatility found in the literature. Ta-
ble 8 presents the empirical results for coordinated 
CBIs wherein the BB(ECB) is one among the banks 
involved. 
Table 8. Coordinated CBIs of Bundesbank (ECB) plus at least another central bank 
Dependent variables Explanatory variables Coordinated interventions 
Conditional mean 
DM(UER) 
Constant 0.0002 (2.247)* 
dCoDM(EUR) 0.0034 (1.525) 
JPY 
Constant 0.0241 (2.545)* 
dCoDM(EUR) 0.1340 (1.077) 
Conditional variance 
DM(EUR) 
Constant 3.62e-07 (2.637)* 
δCoDM(EUR) 1e-05 (1.801) 
αDM(EUR) 0.0330 (5.566)** 
βDM(EUR) 0.9593 (139.1)** 
JPY 
Constant 0.0038 (2.530)* 
δCoDM(EUR) -0.0052 (-0.189) 
αJPY 0.0427 (6.566)** 
βJPY 0.9501 (119.6)** 
DCCα 0.0185 (5.221)** 
DCCβ 0.9794 (241.96)** 
υ 5.8490 (13.90)** 
Log. lik. 7459.8 
Standardized Residuals Based Tests  
  Q(20) 78.32 [0.500] 
 Q2(20) 93.82 [0.093] 
Note: Parentheses and brackets are the t-statistics and p-values, respectively. * and ** denote 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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According to these results, coordinated interventions 
involving the BB(ECB) neither significantly affect 
exchange returns nor volatility. Hence, even when a 
central bank, whose unilateral interventions are 
found to be effective, intervenes in coordination 
with another central bank, its impact on exchange 
returns and volatility diminishes1. This is in line 
with the empirical literature and which strengthens 
our previous results that coordinated CBIs do not 
have the anticipated effect on volatility. 
Another interesting feature is to assess whether 
there exist any asymmetries that is to investigate 
whether the purchase of US dollars has a different 
impact than the sale of US dollars in the foreign 
exchange markets. One would expect that the pur-
chase (sale) of US dollars to be associated with a US 
dollar appreciation (depreciation). If instead a pur-
chase (sale) of US dollars is followed by a US dollar 
depreciation (appreciation), then this may be due to 
a market inefficiency2. In addition, if successful, 
CBIs should significantly decrease volatility. 
In order to assess whether any asymmetries exist 
whenever CBIs take place, two sets of dummy va-
riables were constructed. The one set of dummies in-
volves dummies that are equal to one when a central 
bank purchases US dollars and zero otherwise, and the 
other set involves dummies that are equal to one when 
a central bank sells US dollars and zero otherwise. The 
number of purchases and sales of US dollars by each 
central bank are presented in Table 9. The BoJ again is 
the most active central bank with 149 purchases and 
27 sales of US dollars during our sample period. 
Table 9. Purchase and sale of USD (1991-2001) 
 Purchase of USD Sale of USD 
JPY/USD Number of interventions 
Unilateral FED 0 0 
Unilateral BoJ 149 27 
Unilateral BoE 0 1 
Coordinated interventions of 2 central banks 18 4 
DM(EUR)/USD 
Unilateral FED 6 2 
Unilateral BoJ 0 0 
Unilateral BB/ECB 0 0 
Unilateral BoE 0 0 
Coordinated interventions of 2 central banks 6 4 
Coordinated interventions of 3 central banks 5 2 
 
The estimation results for the purchase and sale of 
USD are presented in Tables 10 and 11, respectively. 
According to Table 10, coordinated purchases of US 
dollars do not significantly affect returns. In addition, 
coordinated purchases of USD in general increase 
volatility, the greater the number of central banks in-
volved. Under column (b) we see that coordinated 
purchases of USD significantly increase JPY volatility. 
In the case of unilateral CBIs, only purchases of USD 
by the BoJ lead to a significant appreciation of the US 
dollar 3,4. That is, unilateral purchases of US dollars are 
found to be more productive than coordinated ones in 
terms of their effect on returns, as they are associated 
with the intended appreciation of the US dollar. No 
significant effects of unilateral CB purchases of USD 
on volatility is reported. 
Table 10. The impact of purchase of USD (1991-2001)123 4 
 Coordinated interventions Unilateral interventions 
Dependent variables Explanatory variables (a) (b) (c) 
Conditional mean DM(EUR) 
Constant 0.0002 (2.329)* 0.0002 (2.164)* 0.0003 (2.783)** 
dCoDM(EUR) 0.010 (1.412)   
dCoDM(EUR) 3  0.0020 (0.500)  
dCOJPY -0.0014 (-0.642)   
dFEDDM(EUR)   -0.0028 (-1.535) 
dBOJJPY   -0.0012 (-2.765)** 
                                                     
1 Other combinations of coordinated CBIs were investigated and the results were of the same qualitative nature. These results can be obtained from the 
author upon request. 
2 It can be explained by the leaning-against-the-wind effect, which means that the central bank attempts to reverse the direction of the exchange rates and 
to influence the trend movement of its currency. 
3 Unilateral FED interventions are also found to lead to an appreciation of the US dollar however, the estimated parameters are insignificant. 
4 A decline in the exchange return denotes an appreciation of the US dollar. 
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Table 10 (cont.). The impact of purchase of USD (1991-2001) 
 Coordinated interventions Unilateral interventions 
Dependent variables Explanatory variables (a) (b) (c) 
 
JPY 
Constant 0.0235 (2.514)* 0.0249 (2.471)* 0.0307 (3.188)** 
dCoDM(EUR) 1.0028 (1.236)   
dCoDM(EUR) 3  0.0242 (0.115)  
dCOJPY -0.0915 (-0.364)   
dFEDDM(EUR)   -0.2953 (-1.909) 
dBOJJPY   -0.1740 (-3.923)** 
Conditional 
variables 
DM(EUR) 
Constant 3e-07 (2.156)* 3e-07 (2.328)* 3e-07 (40.11)** 
δCoDM(EUR) 5e-06 (0.402)   
δCoDM(EUR) 3  2e-05 (1.818)  
δCOJPY 1e-06 (0.195)   
δFEDDM(EUR)   -4e-06 (-0.653) 
δBoJJPY   1e-06 (1.895) 
αDM(EUR) 0.0374 (5.755)** 0.0322 (5.731)** 0.0362 (25.95)** 
βDM(EUR) 0.95.72 (123.9)** 0.9620 (143.6)** 0.9573 (792.2)** 
JPY 
Constant 0.0035 (2.369)* 0.0036 (2.427)* 0.0034 (7.056)** 
δCoDM(EUR) 0.0259 (0.159)   
δCoDM(EUR) 3  0.0261 (0.653)**  
δCOJPY 0.0913 (1.221)   
δFEDDM(EUR)   -0.0163 (-0.336) 
δBOJJPY   0.0101 (1.711) 
αJPY 0.0406 (5.656)** 0.0420 (6.597)** 0.0404 (27.77)** 
βJPY 0.9511 (114.9)** 0.9508 (127.1)** 0.9519 (741.6)** 
DCCα 0.0185 (5.125)** 0.0182 (4.552)** 0.0194 (16.99)** 
DCCβ 0.9794 (242.7)** 0.9797 (221.9)** 0.9782 (729.3)** 
 υ 5.8222 (13.79)** 5.8404 (14.36)** 5.7099 (17.51)** 
 Log. lik. 7462.1 7458.9 7463.5 
Standardized residuals based tests 
  Q(20) 77.48 [0.527] 76.99 [0.543] 79.97 [0.448] 
 Q2(20) 86.48 [0.215] 93.95 [0.092] 83.05 [0.299] 
Note: Parentheses and brackets are the t-statistics and p-values, respectively, significance, respectively. 
In the case of sales of US dollars the results are as 
follows. According to Table 11, coordinated sales of 
USD conducted by two central banks do not signifi-
cantly affect returns and significantly reduce volatility 
of the JPY/USD (when conducted in the DM(EUR)/ 
USD market). However, when coordinated sales of 
USD are conducted by three central banks, no signifi-
cant effect on returns nor volatility is present. In the 
case of unilateral interventions, sales of USD signifi-
cantly lead to a depreciation of the USD (as expected) 
when conducted by the Bank of England. In the other 
cases they are insignificant. More importantly, unila-
teral sales of USD by the Bank of Japan significantly 
reduce the JPY volatility. 
Table 11. The impact of USD sale (1991-2001) 
 Coordinated interventions Unilateral interventions 
Dependent variables Explanatory variables (a) (b) (c) (d) 
Conditional mean 
DM(EUR) 
Constant 0.0002 (2.398)* 0.0002 (2.206)* 0.0002 (2.456)* 0.0002 (2.390)* 
dCoDM(EUR) -0.0110 (-1.469)    
dCoDM(EUR) 3  0.0184 (1.509)   
dCOJPY -0.0015 (-0.394)    
dFEDDM(EUR)   0.0012 (0.135) 0.0022 (0.161) 
dBOJJPY   -0.0010 (-0.813) -0.0010 (-1.068) 
dBoEJPY    0.0319 (6.268)** 
JPY 
Constant 0.0240 (2.641)** 0.0238 (2.288)* 0.0241 (2.564)* 0.0238 (2.440)* 
dCoDM(EUR) -0.5942 (-1.534)    
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Table 11 (cont.). The impact of USD sale (1991-2001) 
 Coordinated interventions Unilateral interventions 
Dependent variables Explanatory variables (a) (b) (c) (d) 
Conditional 
variables 
 
dCoDM(EUR) 3  0.4858 (1.267)   
dCOJPY -0.3346 (-1.173)    
dFEDDM(EUR)   0.4054 (0.907) 0.4122 (0.960) 
dBOJJPY   -0.0296 (-0.343) -0.0300 (-0.394) 
dBoEJPY   0.7744 (3.434)  
DM(EUR) 
Constant 4e-07 (2.489)* 3e-07 (2.171)* 3e-07 (2.354)* 3e-07 (2.229)* 
δCoDM(EUR) 8e-05 (0.581)    
δCoDM(EUR) 3  1e-05 (0.563)   
δCOJPY -1e-05 (-1.60)    
δFEDDM(EUR)   1e-05 (0.533) 1e-05 (0.454) 
δBoJJPY   -1e-07 (-0.083) -1e-07 (-0.096) 
δBoEJPY    -1e-05 (-0.338) 
αDM(EUR) 0.0352 (5.863)** 0.0336 (5.495)** 0.0353 (6.143)** 0.0349 (5.822)** 
βDM(EUR) 0.9588 (132.1)** 0.9600 (121.8)** 0.9590 (140.2)** 0.9597 (132.7)** 
JPY 
Constant 0.0033 (3.229)** 0.0040 (2.436)* 0.0039 (2.971)** 0.0042 (2.830)** 
δCoDM(EUR) -0.1096 (-3.1131)**    
δCoDM(EUR) 3  -0.0645 (-0.879)   
δCOJPY -0.0355 (-0.550)    
δFEDDM(EUR)   -0.1011 (-1.197) -0.1054 (-1.261) 
δBOJJPY   -0.0205 (-2.564)* -0.0212 (-2.404)* 
δBoEJPY   -0.0991 (-1.393)  
αJPY 0.0391 (7.566)** 0.0412 (5.998)** 0.0395 (6.781)** 0.0392 (6.079)** 
βJPY 0.9549 (181.9)** 0.9509 (116.0)** 0.9536 (141.0)** 0.9533 (128.1)** 
DCCα 0.0177 (4.710)** 0.0110 (29615)** 0.0181 (5.540)** 0.0178 (4.452)** 
DCCβ 0.9801 (231.7)** 0.9873 (1173)** 0.9797 (263.8)** 0.9801 (212.5)** 
 υ 5.7890 (14.11)** 5.8096 (13.75)** 5.7727 (14.72)** 5.7865 (13.80)** 
 Log. lik. 7461.7 7454.1 7459.4 7467.1 
Standardized 
residuals based 
tests 
 
  Q(20) 77.57 [0.524] 80.26 [0.438] 80.63 [0.428] 80.62 [0.428] 
 Q2(20) 89.10 [0.163] 78.76 [0.1036] 89.04 [0.164] 88.94 [0.166] 
Note: Parentheses and brackets are the t-statistics and p-values, respectively. * and ** denote 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
Summing up, even when asymmetries are taken 
into account, the results are qualitatively similar to 
those obtained from our main analysis, and thereby 
strengthening our findings. That is, the more coor-
dination of central banks in the foreign exchange 
markets, the more detrimental their effect on returns 
and volatility. Specifically, unilateral purchases and 
sales of US dollars affect returns in the intended 
direction and can significantly reduce exchange rate 
volatility only when conducted by the Bank of Ja-
pan. On the contrary, coordinated interventions con-
ducted by two central banks and, especially by three 
central banks, do not have the intended outcome on 
both returns and volatility. 
Conclusion 
In order to shed some light on the effectiveness of 
official CBIs, this paper examined the signalling 
channel through which official CBIs, conducted unila- 
 
terally or in coordination with two and three central 
banks, could affect exchange returns, their volatility 
and dynamic conditional correlations. A novel con-
tribution of this study is the assessment of the im-
pact of the G4 CBIs on exchange returns, volatility 
and correlations. Specifically, in addition to the 
impact of G3 CBIs of FED, BoJ and the BB (ECB) 
in the DM(EUR)/USD and the JPY/USD markets, 
that has been systematically examined in the litera-
ture, this paper provided results on the G4 interven-
tions by adding the BoE. The investigation was ex-
tended with the application of the DCC model of 
Engle (2002) due to its flexible structure and the 
specification of time-varying conditional correla-
tions. This is another contribution of this paper. The 
DCC model performed very well under the various 
specifications and showed that CBIs slightly intensi-
fy the DM(EUR) and the JPY dynamic conditional 
correlations. 
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Under the G4 assessment, results indicated that offi-
cial CBIs significantly affect exchange returns only 
in the case of unilateral interventions. Regarding 
the impact of CBIs on volatility, it was found that 
unilateral interventions, in some cases, reduce vola-
tility. Coordinated interventions were found to be 
more counterproductive the greater the number of 
central banks intervenes in coordination. 
The results of the impact of the G4 CBIs under the 
DCC assessment are strengthened by various robust-
ness checks, such as re-examining the established G3 
assessment, accounting for coordinated interventions 
by specific central banks that were found to be suc-
cessful unilaterally, and accounting for asymmetries. 
Based on our results, unilateral CBIs can influence 
returns in the intended direction, whereas coordi-
nated CBIs do not have a significant impact on re-
turns. In terms of the impact of CBIs on exchange 
rate volatility the results are as follows. Unilateral or 
even coordinated interventions of 2 central banks, in 
minor cases, significantly decrease volatility. How-
ever, coordinated interventions of 3 central banks in 
the same currency increase volatility, which is the 
exact opposite of the central banks’ intentions. These 
results have important implications for the effec-
tiveness of central banks’ intervention policy deci-
sions. That is, if central banks wish to influence ex-
change rates and/or volatility, they should intervene 
unilaterally. The more central banks intervene in 
coordination the less, or the opposite from the antic-
ipated, would be the generated outcome. 
Moreover, CBIs in one market are found to positive-
ly, albeit marginally, affect correlations between 
foreign exchange markets. That is, CBIs conducted 
either unilaterally or in coordination intensify co- 
movements in foreign exchange markets. This is true 
in a world of highly integrated financial markets and 
might be the reason why such CBIs, and especially 
coordinated ones, increase volatility in these markets 
in most of the cases. 
A limitation of the results obtained in this paper is 
captured by the following counterfactual question: if 
had not central banks intervened, would the impact 
on returns and volatility have been different? This is a 
rather difficult question to address (see, for instance 
Fatum and Hutchison, 2010, for an initial attempt to 
address this question). Nonetheless, a recent growing 
literature has focused on the impact of official state-
ments and speeches of central banks on foreign ex-
change markets prior to intervention (see, for instance 
Gnabo and Teiletche, 2009; Beine et al., 2009a, and 
references therein). Using such an approach, our 
analysis could be extended to answer the above ques-
tion and which we leave for future research. 
In addition, the analysis in this paper was solely 
based on the investigation of the signalling channel 
through which CBIs could affect exchange returns, 
volatility and correlations using daily data under the 
DCC model. That is, the portfolio-balance channel 
was not examined. Hence, an interesting avenue for 
further research is to investigate the impact of the 
G4 CBIs in the context of the portfolio-balance 
channel. 
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